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THE EFFECT AND VALIDITY OF STATE TAXATION OF
ENERGY RESOURCES
I. INTRODUCTION
In its infancy the energy industry was problem ridden.' Over pro-
duction caused deflated prices, waste,2 and environmental damage.3 In
reaction, the states began to conserve their energy resources.4 As de-
mand approached supply, producers resisted state control because it
depressed profits.5 At the insistence of the influential oil lobby,6 state
efforts to curb production7 gave way to federal regulation that favored
accelerated production.' Although the ever increasing federal regula-
tion of energy divests the states of the largely independent control they
1. See D. DAVIS, ENERGY POLITICS 49 (1974).
2. "Waste" describes a failure to extract all the mineral from a field.
3. D. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 45, 49.
4. Seegenerall, R. SULLIVAN, CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS, A LEGAL HISTORY (1958).
5. See, e.g.. R. ENGLER, THE POLITICS OF OIL passim (1961); G. NASH, UNITED STATES OIL
POLICY 1890-1964, at 72-127 (1968); H. WILLIAMSON, THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
238-99, 466-535 (1963).
6. D. DAVIS. supra note 1, at 53-66.
7. M. WILLRICH, ADMINISTRATION OF ENERGY SHORTAGES 252 (1976). The Texas Rail-
road Commission regulated production, including methods to obtain maximum recovery. Id. at
249. Louisiana stressed full removal and waste avoidance. The experiences of that state demon-
strate that conservation and production are synonymous. R. SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 110.
The several producing states entered into interstate compacts as an additional means to regulate
production and to avoid federal control. D. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 53; N. ELY, THE INTERDEPEN-
DENCE OF THE STATES IN OIL CONSERVATION-A SURVEY OF THE INTERSTATE COMPACT (1932).
The states fought in the courts to establish their right to regulate production. See, e.g., Cities Serv.
Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950) (preemption not at issue); Champlin Ref.
Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
8. D. DAVIS, supra note I, at 49. Congress in recent years has enacted a variety of produc-
tion incentives including the oil depletion allowance and quota price-fixing, despite objections
from the Department of the Interior. Id. The federal government simultaneously tightened its
regulatory hold on the oil and gas industry. Supreme Court decisions in the Tidelands Cases,
United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950);
United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947), deprived the states of valuable offshore property
rights. See McElroy, Severance Taxes on Offshore Production-Fact or Fictionl, 9 BAYLOR L. REV.
17, 18-20 (1957). In 1976 Congress returned some of this property, The Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976), but the initial deprivation marked a high point in the federal-
state conflict. D. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 59, 61. In addition, Congress passed the Hot Oil Act, 15
U.S.C. § 715-715(m) (1976), which supported conservation and ensured a higher price for produc-
ers. The Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717-717(w) (1976) vested the authority in the Federal
Power Commission to set interstate rates for the sale and transportation of natural gas.
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once enjoyed, 9 the state struggle to regulate production and distribution
of energy resources is continuing.'0
States often used taxation as a means of regulation. Because energy
is often an article of interstate commerce," state regulation affecting it
may conflict with federal regulation. This federal-state conflict raises
constitutional problems involving the dormant commerce clause' 2 and
the supremacy clause.' 3 The several energy producing states clearly de-
sire: 1) control of the manner and amount of production; 14 2) compen-
sation for the loss of state wealth associated with the extraction of
energy resources; 15 and 3) compensation for environmental damage
and other related costs of energy production.' 6 This Note explains each
of those objectives, applies the objectives to a scheme of taxation, and
finally examines the tax in a constitutional context. Part II of the Note
examines the goal of controlling production by looking at the New
Mexico electricity generation tax and the Oklahoma natural gas pro-
duction tax. Part III focuses on Louisiana's first use tax on gas as an
example of a state attempt to gain compensation for depletion of en-
ergy resources. Part IV discusses the third goal of compensation for
environmental damage. The Note identifies limitations on states' abili-
ties to tax energy and also identifies means to avoid the limitations.
The Note suggests guidelines for tax schemes that affect the control of
energy resources.
II. CONTROL OF PRODUCTION
Control of the manner and the amount of production is an affirma-
tion of the ongoing state desire to conserve scarce energy resources and
9. The Texas Railroad Commission possessed comprehensive authority to control the oil
industry in Texas. The Commission fixed rates and regulated production. The Commission's
control was an extreme example of one state's attempt to control the industry. M. WILLRICH,
supra note 7, at 249-52.
10. For a discussion of federally imposed curtailment and allocation orders in the 1970's, see
id. at 77-107.
11. Id. at 245-47.
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 3 provides: "The Congress shall have the power. . . to regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States. .. ."
13. U.S. CONsT. art VI, cl. 2 states: "The Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land. . . any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
14. See M. WILLRICH, supra note 7, at 252; notes 17-73 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 76-79 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 104-10 infra and accompanying text.
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to protect the environment. Several energy producing states realize this
objective by taxing the volume of energy produced. Recent tax legisla-
tion in New Mexico and Oklahoma illustrates this type of state regula-
tion.
A. The Statutes
The abundance of coal in the northwestern corner of New Mexico, 7
coupled with the economics of high-voltage transmission of electricity,
encouraged the construction of several electrical generating plants in
that region.'8 Utilities and consumers in New Mexico, Arizona, Cali-
fornia, and Texas use electricity produced in this area.' 9 New Mexico
imposes a tax on any person that generates electricity in New Mexico
for the purpose of sale.20 The tax applies to each net kilowatt hour2' of
generated electricity.22 New Mexico also provides a credit against its
gross-receipts tax for any generation tax paid to New Mexico or to any
neighboring state.23 The usual gross-receipts tax is roughly equal to
four percent of electricity sales.24 A person who generates electricity in
New Mexico for interstate sale pays a generation tax of about two per-
cent of sales. A person who generates electricity in New Mexico for
intrastate sale pays no generation tax, but is liable for a gross-receipts
tax roughly equal to four percent of sales. New Mexico's scheme of
taxation increases the utilities' cost of operations, which in turn limits
development and encourages efficiency. The tax thus deters rapid ex-
17. Brief for Respondent at 2, Arizona Public Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979).
18. New Mexico, in Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979), argued that appel-
lant utilities saved $119 million annually by generating electricity in New Mexico and transmit-
tmg it, for example, to Phoenix, Tucson, Los Angeles or El Paso. The figure accounts for the
economic advantages of generating electricity in this part of the country and the costs associated
with coal burning in the densely populated areas to which appellants sell. See generally Bagge,
Coal and Clean Air Law- A Casefor Reconciliation, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 479 (1975); Smith, Electricity
and the Environment. A Season of Discontent, 33 FED. B.J. 71 (1974).
19. Brief for Respondent, Arizona Public Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979).
20. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-18-3 (1978).
21. Electrical Energy Tax Regulation 3:1 (form issued by taxing body of the state of New
Mexico to users):
Net kilowatt hours are calculated by subtracting kilowatt hours of electricity used di-
rectly in the operation of the plant for a month from the gross kilowatt hours generated
by the plant in the same month. Electricity used in any facility of an electrical utility
other than a generating plant may not be subtracted from the total of electricity gener-
ated to New Mexico.
22. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-18-3 (1978).
23. Id. § 7-8-80 (1978).
24. Id. § 7-9-7 (1978).
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ploitation of New Mexico's coal and discourages rapid industrial
growth in the four comers region.
Oklahoma taxes the volume of natural gas removed from the
ground.25 This complex26 tax scheme affects gas that has a gross value
per thousand cubic feet (MCF) between seventeen and one-half cents
and one dollar; the tax increases as the value of the gas decreases.
Oklahoma provides a credit against the state income tax if all state ex-
cise taxes exceed 7.085% of the gross value of minerals produced and if
the state has not reimbursed the producer for the excise taxes paid.27
B. Constitutional Issues
1. Commerce Clause
Conservation has traditionally been a function of state power.28 The
Constitution, however, might not allow the particular means used to
effect this power.29 A tax levied on the generation of electricity pro-
duced in New Mexico but sold outside the state burdens interstate com-
merce. At one time, the mere acknowledgement that the "operating
incidence"3 of a state tax affected interstate commerce placed the tax's
validity in jeopardy,3' and the states had to show that the taxed activity
25. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 1101 (West Supp. 1979).
26. Id. § 1108(A) provides:
There is hereby levied on all natural gas and/or casinghead gas produced and saved
excluding non-taxable royalty a conservation excise tax of seven cents ($0.07) per thou-
sand cubic feet (MCF), less seven percent (7%) of the gross value of each such MCF of
natural gas and for casinghead gas; provided that the conservation excise tax hereby
levied shall not exceed one-third (1/3) of the gross value of each such MCF of the natu-
ral gas and/or casinghead gas so produced and saved. Provided further, the conserva-
tion excise tax herein levied shall never be less than zero.
27. Id. § 2357(D).
28. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84, 93 (1963) ("There is no
doubt that the States do possess power to allocate and conserve scarce natural resources upon and
beneath their lands."). See also Patterson v. Standolind Oil & Gas Co., 305 U.S. 376 (1939);
Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1931); Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254
U.S. 300 (1920).
29. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
30. The term of art describes the impact of the tax. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penny Co., 311 U.S.
435, 444 (1940).
31. Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951), rev'd, Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946). Spector spe-
cifically and the principle in Freeman generally were overruled in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1977). See note 33 infra and accompanying text. The Court, at one
time, permitted a tax when the taxpayer engaged in both intrastate and interstate business and tax
liability was computed by applying the tax rate to the amount of in-state business. Interstate Oil
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss2/5
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was local in nature.32 The Court has now expressly eliminated the ab-
solute immunity from state taxation that interstate commerce once en-
joyed.33 A state tax that affects the control of energy in interstate
commerce is valid if. 1) there is a substantial nexus between the taxed
activity and the taxing state; 2) the tax does not discriminate against
interstate commerce; and 3) the tax fairly relates to the services pro-
vided by the state.34 This tripartite rule reflects economic realities and
Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662 (1949); International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416
(1947); Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Comm'r of Corps. & Taxation, 298 U.S. 553 (1936). The Court in
Spector flatly invalidated any state tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Con-
necticut had imposed a franchise tax, for the privilege of doing business within the state, on a
foreign trucking company using Connecticut highways to conduct its exclusively interstate busi-
ness. The tax was computed at a nondiscriminatory rate on the part of the company's net income
that was reasonably attributable to its business within the state. Thus, it was an invalid tax upon
the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, because the taxpayer had no other business
connection with the state. 340 U.S. at 606-10.
32. Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord,
262 U.S. 172 (1923). See also Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662 (1949); Freeman
v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922); California Co.
v. State, 141 Colo. 288, 348 P.2d 382 (1959), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 285 (1960); Virginia Elec.
& Power Co. v. Haden, 200 S.E.2d 848 (W. Va. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
State supreme courts relied on the local activity doctrine to sustain the New Mexico and
Oklahoma taxes discussed in the text. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. O'Chesky, 91 N.M. 485, 487, 576
P.2d 291, 293 (1978), rep'd sub nom. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979); Post
Oak Oil v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'r, 575 P.2d 964 (Okla. 1978). Reliance on the local activity
doctrine is misplaced. Instead, constitutionality depends upon the tax's effect on the interstate
economy. Developments in the Law-Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business,
75 HARv. L. REV. 953, 968 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law]. This recognition
does not necessarily invalidate a tax on production, on generation, or on first uses, but the taxing
state must justify the economic impact of the tax. Accordingly, a tax will not be invalid because
the subject is not local enough. See generally 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 752 (1977).
33. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1977). The most pronounced
reliance on the locality doctrine appeared in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), and
adherence to the test faded rapidly. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co.
v. Davis. 301 U.S. 548 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937).
In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) the Court shifted focus away from
"local-versus-national" to whether the regulated activity had a sufficient economic impact on in-
terstate commerce. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) impliedly overruled the
locality doctrine.
34. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 285 (1977). The test also requires
apportionment. See Washington Revenue Dep't v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435
U.S. 734, 750 (1978); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 441 (1964). See gener-
all' Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940).
A tax is permissible if it applies in proportion to the business carried on within the state, Inter-
national Shoe v. Shartel, 279 U.S. 429, 433 (1929), but a tax is invalid if it applies to business
conducted outside the state. See note 42 infra. Apportionment prevents taxing more of the activ-
ity's value than occurs within the state. Wash. Revenue Dep't v. Association of Wash. Stevedor-
ing Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 746-47 (1978); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 439-40
Washington University Open Scholarship
350 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 58:345
is not intended to pose a trap for the unwary state legislature. 5
Nexus is the threshold requirement. 6 A definite link must exist be-
tween the taxing state and the person, property, or transaction that the
state seeks to tax.37 The existence of a nexus is essentially a due process
requirement.38
The second element of the test involves the principle that a state may
not levy a tax that discriminates against interstate commerce. This rule
(1964). Taxes on energy production do not implicate apportionment, because the taxed activity
occurs in-state. Taxes levied against in-state uses are similarly beyond the reaches of apportion-
ment. For these reasons, state taxes affecting the control of energy resources avoid apportionment
problems.
35. See 430 U.S. at 279. The components of the Complete Auto test are a synthesis of confus-
ing precursors. See, e.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
457-58 (1958); Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946). Despite reliance on the tax-immunity
status of interstate commerce proclaimed in Spector, the Court did not invalidate state taxes that
had an economic impact on interstate commerce if the state, through careful language, avoided a
direct imposition on interstate commerce. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434
(1959). The Court examined the tax to decide if it discriminated against interstate commerce.
Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977); Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily,
373 U.S. 64 (1963); Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Darnell & Son v. City of
Memphis, 208 U.S. 113 (1908); Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1880); Welton v. Missouri, 91
U.S. 275 (1876). The Court applied the discrimination test in combination with apportionment
and nexus analysis. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
In addition, the Court looked for a special relationship between the tax and the aspect of com-
merce taxed. If the taxing state conferred certain benefits, powers, and privileges on the commerce
involved, the Court upheld the tax. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975);
Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948). See 19 B.C. L. REv. 312, 313 (1978). The
test of Complete Auto represents the accumulation of over fifty years of judicial thought. See
generally Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business and the Supreme Court, 1974 Term:
Standard Pressed Steel and Colonial Pipeline, 62 VA. L. REv. 149, 188 (1976). This culmination
plus the unanimous nature of the Complete Auto opinion gives great weight to the test.
36. Developments in the Law, note 32 supra at 968.
37. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967); Scripto,
Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1960); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45
(1954). A tax levied on a transaction is generally passed on to consumers. Therefore a tax ulti-
mately paid by in-state consumers would not pose a nexus problem. The Court, however, is con-
cerned with the necessary nexus between the state and the person directly liable for the tax.
National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 757 n.9 (1967). See also
Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952); State Tax Comm'n v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
38. International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 352-57 (1944) (Rut-
ledge, J., concurring and dissenting); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 308-26
(1944) (Stone, C.J., dissenting). Due Process prevents a state from taxing a person or activity
outside its jurisdiction. Perhaps the recent redefinition of personal jurisdiction will reduce the
incidence of this problem. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See generally Symposium.-
The Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978 WAsH. U.L.Q. 273.
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is firmly rooted in both history and law.39 The Court does not limit its
inquiry to an evaluation of facial discrimination but accounts for all
relevant factors that might make the tax discriminatory when applied.n
The Court considers the economic nature of the taxed activity,41 re-
views the combinations of taxes that operate against that economic ac-
tivity,42 and examines the taxing schemes of neighboring states that
affect the commerce involved. 3 Underlying the rule is the desire to
39. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949). Contra, Madden v. Ken-
tucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87 (1940) (Kentucky ad valorem property tax of ten cents per one hundred
dollars deposited in the state banks and fifty cents per hundred in out-of-state banks sustained;
aberrational result inconsistent with the foregoing analysis).
The discrimination test is not reserved solely for taxation cases. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of
Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (retail gasoline sales); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (interstate sales); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375
U.S. 361 (1964) (interstate milk sales); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951)
(interstate milk sales); Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346 (1939) (interstate
milk sales). But see Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (ordinance regulating ped-
dlers soliciting orders in interstate commerce not unreasonable burden on interstate commerce).
Mechanically stated, the rule is simple: "No state may impose a tax which discriminates against
interstate commerce either by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business or by
subjecting interstate commerce to the burden of multiple taxation." Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959) (citations omitted). A similar test is stated in
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1950).
40. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963); Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring); Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Nippert v. City
of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
41. Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 421 n.5 (1946). See also McGoldrick v.
Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 46-49 (1940).
42. Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 968: "A number of taxes of different descrip-
tions are imposed by different states: franchise taxes, severance taxes, excises on manufacturing,
on transportation, storage ... sales taxes, use taxes. Even if no state exacts payment of all of
these, a multistate concern may well find itself paying many. . . ..' See also McCullough Trans.
Co. v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 113 N.J. Super. 356, 358-59, 273 A.2d 786, 788-89 (App. Div.
1971).
43. The Court recognizes the prohibition against multiple burdens, but it is unclear from the
case law whether the prohibition applies to actual burdens or to the mere risk of multiple burdens.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (potential for multiple burdens considered rele-
vant); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) (must show actual
discrimination); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (Court considered con-
flicting regulations); Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947) (risk of
multiple burdens); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (potential for multiple in-
consistent burdens). See also Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Morgan v.
Virginia, 328 U.S. 373 (1946); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878); Williams Rentals, Inc. v. Tid-
well, 516 S.W.2d 614 (Tenn. 1974). Commentators have encouraged the Court to adopt the risk
approach, because it prevents one state from exploiting another state's failure to tax interests com-
merce to the full extent possible. See P. HARTMAN, STATE TAxATIoN OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
273-85 (1953); Developments in the Law, supra note 32, at 965. In Complete Auto, however, the
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establish a strong union not susceptible to destruction through balkani-
zation of its economy.' 4 Discrimination arises in two contexts: state
attempts to erect barriers to outgoing trade and state attempts to erect
barriers to incoming trade.45
The third element of the test mandates that a state tax be fairly re-
lated to the services provided by the state. The state must provide
financial justification for the levy.46 States commonly provide a variety
of services, including access to the courts and police protection, to per-
sons operating within their boundaries. In addition, states must deal
with environmental problems caused by energy production.47 Finally,
states face socioeconomic problems directly attributable to the growth
of communities in which new energy production facilities are located.4
The New Mexico tax may survive a commerce clause test. The sub-
ject of the electricity generation tax occurs within the state's boundaries
and thus satisfies the nexus requirement.49 New Mexico's tax on gener-
ation of electricity sold in the interstate market at first appears to be a
Court in dictum required an actual showing of multiple burdens. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288-89 n.15. See also Washington Revenue Dep't v. Association of Wash.
Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 746 (1978).
44. An explication of the Founder's intention appears in Justice Jackson's opinion in H.P.
Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949):
"[T]his principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the gamut of
powers necessary to control of the economy, including the vital power of erecting cus-
toms barriers against foreign competition, has as its corollary that the states are not sepa-
rable economic units .... [Tihe established interdependence of the states only
emphasizes the necessity of protecting interstate movement of goods against local bur-
dens and repressions....
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every crafts-
man shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free acess to every
market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and no foreign
state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may
look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from
exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has been the doctrine of
this Court which has given it reality.
Id. at 537-39.
45. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 127 (9th ed. 1975).
46. See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141, 151 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring).
47. Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290 (1937); Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183
(1931); Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554 (1927). The Court diluted this requirement by creating a
strong presumption that the tax represents no more than reasonable compensation to the state.
Capital Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950).
48. See notes 104-10 infra and accompanying text.
49. Washington Revenue Dep't v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 750
(1978); Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 409 U.S. 275, 279 (1972).
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discriminatory burden on outgoing trade, because interstate sellers
must pay the two percent generation tax, while intrastate sellers are
allowed to credit the generation tax against their gross-receipts tax. In-
trastate sellers, however, remain liable for a gross-receipts tax that is
close to four percent, which is a greater tax burden than that imposed
on interstate sellers.50 For these reasons, energy production taxes struc-
tured like New Mexico's do not discriminate against interstate com-
merce. Concerning the relationship between services and the tax, New
Mexico must show that the state uses the revenue received from the tax
to alleviate the problems caused by energy production and to provide
required services.5 ' The Court has vigorously expressed its intentions
to require more than legislative design as a justification. 2 In order to
make a prima facie case, the state should provide figures that accu-
rately show total direct costs, total indirect costs, and the attributable
share of each to the taxpayer operating in interstate commerce. 53 A
state could determine whether a fair relationship exists between the tax
and the services provided by matching these figures with the estimated
proceeds. States have not made this type of showing in the courts,54
which suggests that an inequitable relationship exists between the taxes
paid by energy producers and the costs incurred by the state. Although
this analysis indicates a need for stricter scrutiny, the Court will not
necessarily invalidate a tax like New Mexico's if a reasonable basis ex-
ists for taxing producers.
The foregoing analysis sustains the New Mexico generation tax
against a commerce clause challenge. The Oklahoma tax should also
survive commerce clause criticism. The commerce clause test requires
50. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
51. The controlling question is whether the State has given anything for which it can ask
compensation. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penny Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1949). See also National Bellas
Hess v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967); Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382,
385 (1952); Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line, 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949).
52. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978) (Court invalidated a safety
regulation as an impermissible burden on interstate commerce; state failed to demonstrate suffi-
ciently that the regulation actually enhanced safety).
53. The Supreme Court has not required a detailed showing. Instead, a state is permitted to
impose a tax to pay for provisions to the taxpayer of police protection, for access to legal process,
for access to the courts, and for the right to sell property, without a specific showing of costs
attributable to the group of taxpayers levied against. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S.
100, 109 (1975); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 96 (1948).
54. See Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. O'Chesky, 91 N.M. 485, 576 P.2d 291 (1978), rev'd sub
nom. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979); Post Oak Oil Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 575
P.2d 964 (Okla. 1978); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Haden, 200 S.E.2d 848 (W. Va. 1973).
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a nexus between the activity and the state, nondiscrimination against
interstate commerce, and a reasonable relationship between the tax and
state services. Gas production is the direct result of an activity that
occurs within the state's boundaries. The numerous gas wells in the
state are physical evidence of the nexus between the activity taxed and
the taxing state. The Oklahoma tax satisfies the second part of the
commerce clause test, because it does not discriminate against inter-
state commerce. Oklahoma taxes all in-state production at a facially
nondiscriminatory rate. The state allows the taxpayer a credit for a
portion of the taxes paid, but applies the credit against a tax on all
producers-the state income tax. Interstate producers may use the
credit to the same extent as intrastate producers. In this way,
Oklahoma avoids unconstitutional discrimination against interstate
commerce. 55 The Oklahoma tax may be fairly related to the state ser-
vices provided to producers, but Oklahoma has not offered empirical
proof to substantiate the relationship. The tax yielded forty million
dollars in 1978.56 The state has not disclosed the types of services and
the cost of providing the services. If challenged, Oklahoma would be
forced to demonstrate a fair relationship. Although an application of
strict scrutiny is unlikely, a court would demand more than a general
recital of costs.
2. Supremacy Clause
The New Mexico and Oklahoma statutes must also undergo
supremacy clause analysis.58 Congress recently enacted legislation
55. The tax indirectly favors intrastate sales, because it decreases with increases in gross
value. Higher gross values attach to intrastate sales. Intrastate sellers, therefore, pay less tax than
interstate sellers, because of federally imposed lower prices on interstate gas. Any discrimination
that results is too tenuously related to the state tax to raise constitutional concerns. See notes 25-
27 supra and accompanying text.
56. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
57. See notes 104-10 infra and accompanying text.
58. See notes 20-27 supra. The federal government is one of enumerated powers. McCul-
lough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Congress may exercise an enumerated power to achieve an end within the scope of the
enumerated power themselves. . . . When Congress regulates an activity. . . within the
scope of an enumerated power, as a means to some end that is also within the enumer-
ated powers, the power of the states to regulate either the means or the ends depends
upon the will of Congress.
Id. at 405. See also Engdahl, Preemptive Capabiliy of Federal Power, 45 COLO. L. REv. 51, 57
(1973).
Before congressional action, the Court is concerned with the preemptive power of the dormant
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prohibiting electricity generation or transmission taxes that discrimi-
nate against out-of-state consumers. 9 In Arizona Public Service Co. v.
Snead,6" the Court relied on federal legislation to invalidate the New
Mexico generation tax,6" basing its decision on the supremacy clause.62
The New Mexico tax, through the operation of its tax credit provisions,
imposed a levy against interstate market electricity and exempted elec-
tricity bound for intrastate markets. Congress was not concerned with
the impact of the entire scheme of taxation. Congress intended the stat-
ute to invalidate a discriminatory tax on generation.63 In view of this
narrow meaning of discrimination, the New Mexico generation tax in-
directly, but necessarily, discriminated against interstate commerce.
The supremacy clause invalidated the tax because the tax conflicted
directly with federal law.6" This federal legislation does not necessarily
preclude all generation taxes; there is evidence that Congress specifi-
cally designed the federal law to invalidate the New Mexico tax.65
commerce clause, which governs the extent of state regulation allowable when Congress is silent.
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). Once Congress regulates an area the
focus shifts to the supremacy clause. The cases are complicated by the Court's recognition of
concurrent state and federal regulation in certain cases. City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 102 (1837) (recognized concurrent regulation as compatible). Contra Missouri Pac. R.R. v.
Porter, 273 U.S. 341, 346 (1927) (recognized federal regulation as exclusive); Charleston & W.
Carolina Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915) (overlapping state law held
ineffectual inasmuch as it attempted to go further than federal law). Modern interpretation of the
supremacy clause prohibits concurrent regulation. Note, The Preemptive Doctrine- Shifting Per-
spectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623, 653-54 (1975). State regula-
tion is valid only if Congress has not made clear its intention to preempt or if a conflict is not ripe
or is peripheral to the purpose of the federal statute. Id. at 653.
59. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6201 (1976).
60. 441 U.S. 141 (1979).
61. Id. at 148-49.
62. Id. at 146.
63. See note 65 infra and accompanying text.
64. 441 U.S. at 149-50.
65. Senator Fannin of Arizona proposed a bill to ban the Electrical Energy Tax. The Senate
Finance Committee approved the bill. S. REP. No. 94-938, pt. I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 437-38
(1976). The Senate later passed the bill, 122 CONG. REC. D1093 (daily ed. July 28, 1976); the bill's
sponsors, however, decided to make it a part of the Tax Reform Act. The Bill then went to a
House-Senate Conference Committee that discarded the Senate bill's test of discrimination and
devised a new one. 122 CONG. Rnc. Dl 144 (daily ed. Aug. 25, 1976). The new language was
tailored to avoid invalidating West Virginia's generation tax. Brief for Respondent at Appendix
C, Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979). As the brief suggests, appellants "wished
to steer a bill through Congress which would outlaw New Mexico's tax but no other state's." Id.
at 16.
When confused, courts may consult the legislative history as an aid to construction-Train v.
Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1975); United States v. American Truck-
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The Natural Gas Act of 193866 prevents the states from directly or
indirectly regulating the price of gas sold in interstate commerce. 67 The
Oklahoma tax on production is a cost ultimately borne by the con-
sumer and thus, constitutes an indirect regulation of rates. In addition,
the Natural Gas Act and its regulations show a clear congressional in-
tent to subject natural gas to uniform rates and regulations. 68 Supple-
mentary state regulation is inappropriate,69 especially if that regulation
hinders the objective of uniformity by imposing a tax that discriminates
against interstate commerce. State production taxes, however, fall
outside the scope of the Act.70 The Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC) is without power to expand the scope of the Act.7' For
these reasons, a tax on production avoids preemption. If the tax does
not contravene the commerce clause, it provides the states with a valid
means of protecting their energy resources. Taxes on generation are
valid if not complicated by crediting schemes that nullify the liability of
intrastate generators.72 In addition, a taxing scheme is valid if it lowers
the gross-receipts tax on sales of electricity instead of providing for a
gross-receipts tax credit equal to the generation tax. This type of taxing
scheme is appropriate even though the plan has the same practical ef-
fect as the New Mexico tax because it embodies an even-handed tax on
generation.73
Another way in which the states can avoid preemption problems is to
tax activities that Congress entrusted to state regulation. The genera-
ing Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940); Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die.: The "Plain Afeaning
Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299
(1975)-but they seldom rely on it. United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648 (1961); Packard
Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 492 (1947); Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R.,
257 U.S. 563, 589 (1922).
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717(a)-(z) (1976).
67. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84, 91 (1963); Natural Gas
Pipeline Co. v. Panoma Corp., 349 U.S. 44,44-45 (1955) (per curiam) (prohibited a direct interfer-
ence).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 717(d) (1979). See Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S.
378 (1959).
69. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507 (1947).
70. Statements of General Policy and Interpretation under the Natural Gas Act, 18 C.F.R.
§ 2.56(a) (1979), exclude from the rate base all state or federal taxes on production. Federal
Power Comm'n v. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498, 503 (1949) (Act expressly exempts
from its coverage the production and gathering of natural gas).
71. Mobile Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 463 F.2d 256 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
72. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 8101 (Purdon Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 82.16.020,
.050 (1974); W. VA. CODE §§ 1l-13-2(d)(m) (Supp. 1979).
73. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 278 n.7 (1977).
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tion tax, which imposed economic disincentives on coal mining,
prompted conservation. New Mexico could have imposed similar dis-
incentives by increasing the tax on the severance of coal from the
ground. The tax would slow depletion of a finite energy resource and
would discourage exploitation of New Mexico's coal fields by increas-
ing the cost of electricity generated from this coal. The Oklahoma tax
utilizes this technique.
II. COMPENSATION FOR EXTRACTION OF ENERGY RESOURCES
A. Economic Background
The second objective of energy producing states, compensation for
the depletion of wealth associated with the extraction of energy re-
sources, suggests a desire by these states to provide for themselves at
the expense of the nation. The framers of the Constitution designed the
commerce clause to prevent this type of balkanization.74 The Supreme
Court expressed at an early date, in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, its
intolerance for state regulation that favored state citizens to the detri-
ment of foreign citizens.75 In 1920, natural gas reserves in West Vir-
ginia were significantly depleted. Noting the increasing demand for
gas, the state legislature required each distributor of gas produced in
West Virginia to meet the in-state demand before distributing gas inter-
state. The legislature, through regulation, afforded in-state consumers
a preferred right of purchase of West Virginia gas. The Court invali-
dated this regulation that clearly discriminated against interstate con-
sumers of energy.76
A tax which compensates a state for the depletion of its valuable
energy resources is similarly invalid because the tax requires foreign
citizens to reimburse the state for the loss of resources and simultane-
ously benefits the state's citizens from the lower price of the product.
The pursuit of compensation for extraction of resources necessarily ex-
74. See note 39 supra.
75. 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
76. Id. at 593. For a similar result, see West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1920):
The statute [of Oklahoma] recognizes [gas] to be a subject of intrastate commerce, but
seeks to prohibit it from being the subject of interstate commerce, and this is the purpose
of its conservation .... If the States have such power a singular situation might result.
Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its timber, the mining States their min-
erals .... If one State has it, all States have it; embargo may be retaliated by embargo,
and commerce will be halted at state lines.
Id. at 255.
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ploits foreign citizens in need of energy, inhibits free competition, and
prevents free trade among the states.77 A state desiring this kind of
compensation should not declare that intention 78 because the declara-
tion taints the court's analysis and provides a basis for invalidating the
tax. Louisiana recently enacted a use tax on energy.79 The tax does not
specifically propose to derive compensation for the depletion of energy
resources, but the history behind its enactment suggests that the legisla-
ture intended compensation. 0
Prior to 1950, Louisiana maintained sovereignty over the tidelands
off its coast, which held an abundant supply of oil and gas. A series of
Supreme Court cases deprived Louisiana of this valuable offshore
77. The Court has not permitted the states to burden the exportation of local products to
enhance local interests. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (invalidated Arizona law
requiring canteloupes to be packaged in-state); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525
(1949) (denial of license to Massachusetts milk distributor by state of New York on ground that
local supply would be reduced overturned); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1
(1928) (restrictions on interstate shipment of shrimp as means of insuring local employment inval-
idated); f Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915) (upholding state law prohibiting the interstate
shipment of citrus fruit not fit for consumption).
The Court has permitted state regulations that prohibit the shipment of water out of the state,
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908), and wild animals, Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 529 (1896); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 394 (1877). The Court
has not overruled these decisions, but they are dubious and deserve mention only because of the
interesting theory advanced in the cases. The Court recognized the state as an equitable owner of
all state resources on behalf of the citizenry until these resources were reduced to possession. In
this capacity, the state could regulate certain transactions before they became a part of interstate
commerce.
The recognized invalidity of state action advantaging local citizens at the expense of interstate
citizens is a principle the Court applies in privilege and immunity clause cases. See Baldwin v.
Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948),
78. The taxing states demonstrated a desire to raise revenue, perhaps partly to account for the
indirect costs associated with energy production. More pertinent to this discussion, each state
enacted a tax to equalize what it perceived to be inherent discrimination operating against the
state and its citizens. This assertion, though speculative, follows from the history surrounding the
taxes. Louisiana probably considers the gas producers on the Outer Continental Shelf, who were
once under Louisiana's control, unfairly advantaged because they need not pay a tax comparable
to the Louisiana severance tax. See note 83 infra. Oklahoma also reacted, eliminating an existing
discrimination perceived to operate against its citizens because of the effect of federal regulations
on severance taxpayers. See note 55 supra. New Mexico implies a similar dissatisfaction with
pretax conditions, perhaps feeling exploited by neighboring states and their citizens. See note 18
supra.
79. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47-1301-07 (West Supp. 1980). See notes 83-88 infra and accom-
panying text.
80. See note 8 supra. See also First Use Tax, 31 La. Coastal L. Rep. 1 (October 1978).
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property. 1 In 1976 Congress passed legislation returning some of the
property, 2 but Louisiana still lacks sovereignty over most offshore gas-
production. Louisiana thus, cannot tax offshore producers under the
state severance tax on natural gas. Louisiana's inability to tax awards
offshore producers an economic advantage over Louisiana producers,
who must pay a severance tax. 3
Louisiana imposed a tax on the first use of gas in the state to eradi-
cate this economic discrepancy. 4 "First use" includes any ascertain-
able action within the state. First uses include sale, transportation to a
point of delivery, and processing for the extraction of waste.8 5 A tax of
seven cents per MCF applies to the first use of gas.86 The first use tax
exempts gas already subject to a severance tax on the volume of pro-
duction. 7 The scheme excludes all gas purchased in Louisiana and in
neighboring states.88 The tax, in practical terms, operates only against
gas entering the state from the Outer Continental Shelf or from foreign
countries.8 9 In addition, the state provides a credit against the use tax
equal to any severance tax due Louisiana.90 Only producers who own
wells on the Shelf and in Louisiana may credit any use tax against sev-
erance tax liability because only these producers are liable for both the
Louisiana severance tax and the Louisiana use tax. This circumstance
further focuses the impact of the use tax on nonLouisiana producers.
81. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699
(1950); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
82. The Outer Continental Shelf Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976); The Submerged Land Act, 43
U.S.C. § 3101 (1976).
83. First Use Tax, 31 La. Coastal L. Rep. 1 (October 1978).
84. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1301(A) (West Supp. 1980).
85. Id. § 47-1302(8):
"Use" is: the sale; the transportation in the state to the point of delivery at the inlet of
any processing plant; the transportation in the state of unprocessed natural gas to the
point of delivery at the inlet of any measurement or storage facility; transfer of posses-
sion or relinquishment of control at a delivery point in the state; processing for the ex-
traction of liquefiable component products or waste materials; use in manufacturing;
treatment; or other ascertainable action at a point within the state.
86. id. § 47-1303(B).
87. Id. § 47-1303(A).
88. Id. Texas imposes a severance tax on the production of natural gas, TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 22.01 (Vernon 1979), as do Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-25-701 (1972), and
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 1101 (West Supp. 1979).
89. First Use Tax, 31 La. Coastal L. Rep. (October 1978).
90. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-647 (West Supp. 1979).
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B. Consfitutional Analysis
1. Commerce Clause
a) Nexus
The commerce clause analysis begins with the nexus requirement.
The nexus between the "first use" and Louisiana is not readily appar-
ent. The subject of the tax is not the gas, the property, or the right to
produce the gas-rather, the tax applies to the first use of gas in the
state, whether the use is sale, transportation, transfer of possession, or
processing.9' The presence of several salesmen conducting local solici-
tation is sufficient to charge an out-of-state seller with a use tax on the
sale of goods shipped to customers in-state;92 but when the taxpayer is
engaged only in the delivery of goods to a point in-state, the nexus is
insufficient.93 The use tax on transportation of gas inland, therefore, is
suspect. Transportation of gas, however, differs from the delivery of
other goods. Gas travels by pipeline or ship; the pipeline owns most of
the gas brought ashore.94 The state gives the pipelines, which necessar-
ily touch Louisiana, police and judicial protection. In return, the state
taxes the operation of the pipelines. Similarly, shipping lines that de-
liver gas use state police and judicial protection while docked in Louisi-
ana ports. This nexus satisfies the constitutional requirement.
b) Discrimination
The tax may not discriminate against interstate commerce. This re-
quirement is the major obstacle to achieving compensation for extrac-
tion of resources. Compensating use taxes are valid despite challenges
based on discrimination.95 The Louisiana use tax eliminates some of
91. First Use Tax, 31 La. Coastal L. Rep. 1, 1-2 (October 1978). Any in-state activity that
produces income is sufficient. See Northwestern Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450, 465 (1959).
92. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
93. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954) (delivery using company trucks pursu-
ant to orders solicited by local advertising); Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373
(1941) (delivery through the mail without the assistance of in-state retail outlets); Nelson v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941) (delivery through the mail without the assistance of in-state
retail outlets).
94. First Use Tax, 31 La. Coastal L. Rep. 1, 2 (October 1978).
95. Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937). See also General Trading Co. v.
State Tax Conim'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944); Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472 (1932). Wash-
ington enacted a tax on retail sales, and because several neighboring states did not, Washington
feared a large reduction in the volume of retail sales in Washington. As a remedy, Washington
imposed a compensating use tax. All items purchased out-of-state and brought into Washington
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the economic advantages once enjoyed by interstate concerns. Offshore
producers, not liable for a severance tax, now pay a use tax. Louisiana
producers, not liable for a use tax, now pay a severance tax. The Loui-
siana tax, because it equalizes the treatment of intrastate and interstate
producers, is valid. Opponents, however, contend that the tax is
designed to provide a source of compensation for the depletion of off-
shore reserves originally under Louisiana sovereignty. 96 The tax would
thus, discriminate against interstate commerce because it would burden
incoming gas rather than gas produced in-state. 97 A reviewing court
might hold the tax invalid if the court would conclude that the Louisi-
ana measure is actually a production tax on offshore gas.
c) Relation Between the Tax and State Services
The Louisiana tax does not violate the third prong of the commerce
clause test. Louisiana incurs costs in providing state services to pipe-
line and tanker owners. Information detailing the actual revenue
needed to provide state services is not available. Louisiana should be
able to demonstrate a reasonable relationship between revenues and
costs and justify at least part of the intake.
2. Supremacy Clause
The Louisiana tax faces other constitutional challenges; 9 a possible
were subject to a tax equal to the Washington sales tax. In-state sales were exempt, because the
compensating tax was designed to equalize the treatment of all users of retail merchandise in
Washington.
96. See note 4 supra. Production taxes compensate the state for depletion of the resource to
the extent that the revenue received exceeds the cost of production to the state, e.g., environmental
damage. The same logic applies to the Louisiana use tax levied against offshore producers.
97. The case law test of discrimination that appears in Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951), prevents the imposition of an economic barrier that operates to the
advantage of local citizens by inhibiting interstate concerns. The basic rule retains its vitality.
Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978); Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977). Figures submitted by the federal government in Federal En-
ergy Regulatory Comm'n v. McNamara, No. 78-394 (D. La., filed September 29, 1978), indicate
the extent of the interstate burden imposed by the Louisiana tax:
Based on the OCS volumes entering Louisiana in interstate commerce in 1977, the
imposition of the First Use Tax will cost interstate consumers approximately
$225,000,000 per annum. By geographic region, the impact of the First Use Tax will be
as follows: New England $6.8 million, Appalachian $84.8 million, Southeast $28.6 mil-
lion, Great Lakes $52.4 million, Gulf Coast $48.5 million.
98. The Louisiana tax exempts the use of gas in the manufacture of fertilizer or ammonia
within the state. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47-1303(A) (West Supp. 1980). This provision is open to
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violation of the supremacy clause is the most formidable. 99 FERC has
the express power to establish a uniform regulation of the sale and
transportation of gas traveling in interstate commerce.' FERC's au-
thority is inclusive of the power to fix prices.' 0 ' Unlike the severance
tax, the use tax is not outside the scope of FERC's control. A conflict
thus, arises between the exercise of federal power and state taxation.1
0 2
FERC's opposition to the tax 0 3 may perhaps preempt the state tax.
The above discussion indicates that achieving the first objective of
compensation for extraction of resources is very difficult, if not impossi-
a commerce clause challenge on the grounds that it discriminates against out-of-state manufactur-
ers.
The Louisiana tax allegedly impairs the obligation of contracts, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1,
because it declares invalid any agreement by which an owner claims a right of reimbursement for
first use taxes paid from any other party in interest, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-1303(C) (West
Supp. 1980), to insure that consumers pay the tax.
The New Mexico and Louisiana taxes are subject to challenges that they violate the import-
export clause, U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2. Challengers of the New Mexico tax argue that some
of the electricity generated in-state travels to Mexico and thus prevents New Mexico from impos-
ing an export duty on it. A similar attack can be levied against the Louisiana tax, because it
operates against gas imported from foreign countries, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-1303(A) (West
Supp. 1980), as long as there is no federal duty on imported gas. 19 U.S.C. § 1202, Sch. 4, Item
475.15 (1976). "To export means to carry or send abroad; to import means to bring into the
country. Those acts begin and end at the water's edge. [A broader definition] would lead back to
every forest, mine, and factory in the land and create a zone of tax immunity never before
imagined." Canton R.R. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511, 515 (1951). See Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418
(1903); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886). These cases defeat the challengers' argument because
both states' taxes operate at a point sufficiently removed from the border.
The Oklahoma tax raised a privileges and immunities clause issue-U.S. CONST. art. IV § 2-
and an equal protection issue-U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. The Oklahoma Supreme Court im-
pliedly dismissed both, in Post Oak Oil v. Tax Comm'n, 575 P.2d 964 (Okla. 1978). The United
States Supreme Court upheld the tax even though it operated exclusively against out-of-state pur-
chasers. Henneford v. Silas Mason, 300 U.S. 577, 588 (1937).
99. The government also challenges the state's attempt to regulate economic waste. The Sec-
retary of Energy may establish and enforce curtailment programs, 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b) (Supp.
1979); 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(E) (Supp. 1979).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 717(d) (Supp. 1979); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S.
378 (1959).
101. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6201 (1976).
102. The Louisiana tax interferes with Section 7(c) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 717(f)(c) (1976). Section 7(c) requires interstate sellers to obtain a certification of public conven-
ience. The certification contains the terms for the sale of gas, including the right of pipelines to
seek reimbursement from producers for all costs, including taxes. The Louisiana statute declares
these reimbursement contracts invalid. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:1303(C) (West Supp. 1979). An
obvious conflict arises, which is likely to result in the invalidation of that part of the Louisiana
statute that invalidates such contracts.
103. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. McNamara, No. 78-394 (D. La. filed September
28, 1978).
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ble. A state may not devise a taxing scheme that exploits interstate
consumers by exacting from them compensation for the depletion of
the states' resources. The courts are likely to disfavor this second ob-
jective of energy producing states because of the need for the
unimpeded flow of interstate commerce. The third enumerated objec-
tive-compensation for environmental change-is not difficult to real-
ize.
III. COMPENSATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE AND
ANCILLARY COSTS OF PRODUCTION
The energy producing states seek compensation for environmental
damage and other related costs of energy production." Taxation is
the most logical means to reach this objective. The commerce clause,
according to recent interpretation,105 does not prohibit a tax that pro-
vides this compensation, but rather encourages a tax imposed to com-
pensate for environmental damage. The Court recognizes that
interstate commerce is not immune from state taxation if the tax is
fairly related to services provided. 1°6
The taxes described above respond, at least in part, to the cost of
reversing the environmental damage associated with energy produc-
tion. The states allocate most of the proceeds derived from the taxes to
general revenue accounts,10 7 but also devote a substantial amount to
104. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 1108, 1111 (West Supp. 1979) set aside the tax receipts for
energy conservation and research programs. 1978 LA. Acrs 293 creates a special conservation
fund, allocating to it twenty-five percent of the tax receipts. The fund accommodates "capital
improvement projects designed to conserve, preserve, and maintain the barrier islands, reefs, and
shores of' the state's coastline that are necessarily subject to environmental damage by the main-
tenance of pipelines to the Outer Continental Shelf. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-1351(A)(3) (West
Supp. 1980). New Mexico dedicates half the proceeds of its tax to the Electrical Energy Fund.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-1-6 (1978). The statute does not express a purpose, but the tax probably
provides some funds to remedy problems caused by the generation of electricity.
105. See generallv Washington Revenue Dep't v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435
U.S. 734, 751 (1978); note 109 infra.
106. See notes 33-38, 49 supra and accompanying text.
107. New Mexico allocates half of the tax proceeds to the general fund. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-
1-6 (1978). Oklahoma allocates 90% of the proceeds to the retirement fund, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
68, § 1103 (West Supp. 1979), but evidence suggests that this allocation is temporary and that the
ultimate beneficiary of these proceeds will be the general fund. The Oklahoma Daily Law Jour-
nal, Nov. 2, 1977, at 1, col. 4. Louisiana allocates 75% of the proceeds to debt retirement and
redemption accounts. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 47-1351A(2) (West Supp. 1980). The general funds'
revenues are substantial. Oklahoma expected the tax to yield $40,000,000 in 1978 (Post Oak Oil v.
Tax Comm'n, 575 P.2d 964, 967 (Okla. 1978)); Louisiana expects $185,000,000 in 1979 (First Use
Tax, 31 La. Coastal L. Rep. 1 (October, 1978)); and New Mexico assessed a tax of $5,000,000 on
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conservation. 0 8
Energy production certainly causes environmental damage-the is-
sue is the extent of the damage. Under present commerce clause analy-
sis, costs must fairly relate to revenue.'0 9 The state bears the burden of
showing an acceptable correlation between revenues and costs because
the state has ready access to the necessary figures.110 A reasonable rela-
tion, not necessarily a one-to-one correlation, must exist.
CONCLUSION
Energy producing states desire control over the amount and manner
of production, compensation for the depletion of their energy re-
sources, and compensation for damage to the environment and for so-
cioeconomic problems associated with energy production. These states
often attempt to achieve these goals through taxation.
This Note has attempted to demonstrate the various problems raised
by the imposition of a state tax on energy. Approaches to the problems
begin with a thorough examination of the taxation statute's design.
The constitutional analysis consists of a series of questions: is there a
sufficient nexus with the taxing state?; does the tax discriminate against
interstate commerce?; is the tax fairly related to the services provided
by the state?; has Congress preempted state regulation in this area?
This line of questioning can demonstrate the validity of a state tax on
energy.
Rules governing state taxation will not remain static because the
courts have decided to scrutinize more carefully state taxation of inter-
state commerce. The power to control the amount of production and
three utilities (Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. O'Chesky, 91 N.M. 485, 487, 576 P.2d 291, 293 (1978),
rev'dsub nom. Arizona Pub. Serv. Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979)).
108. Louisiana, for example, allocates 25% of the proceeds to a special conservation fund. In
1979, Louisiana expected the tax to yield $185,000,000. Thus, the state allocated $406,625 for the
restoration of Louisiana's coastlines and barrier reefs. First Use Tax, 31 La. Coastal L. Rep. I
(October, 1978).
109. See notes 33-38, 49 supra and accompanying text.
110. The best analogy is to federal income tax law. The taxpayer carries the burden of prov-
ing his deductions. Hughes v. Commissioner, 451 F.2d 975 (2d Cir. 1971); cf. Cohan v. Commis-
sioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930) (Board of Tax Appeals allowed to use estimates for expenses in
computing tax owed). See Heckerling, The Rise and Demise of the Cohan Rule, 7 TAX CouN-
SELOR'S Q. 23 (1963); Sheehan & Sullivan, Convention Expenses. How to Prove Business Connec-
lion to the IRS's Satlfaction, 6 TAx. FOR ACCOUNTANTS 146 (1971); Taylor, Record Keeping
Requirements.- Steps to Take to A voidDisallowance of T& EExpenses, 5 TAX. ACCOUNTANTS 366
(1970).
[Vol. 58:345
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss2/5
Number 2] STATE TAXATION OF ENERGY RESOURCES 365
distribution of natural resources may be preempted. Preservation of
the environment through compensatory assessments, however, is not
beyond the limits of state power. In addition, state taxes are valid if
they are designed to raise a fair sum for the cost of providing state
services incident to energy production. Any tax is unconstitutional if
the tax recoups the depletion of a state's wealth and is not in some
measurable way associated with actual costs to the state. Constitu-
tional demands force the producing states to recognize their inability to
favor their own citizens or to hoard future supplies. These same de-
mands, however, allow the prevention of resource exploitation, which
benefits the individual states and the nation.
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